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COMPENSATION REALL Y MATTER?
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It is intended to make the results of Center research, conferences, and projects available to
others interested in human resource management in preliminary form to encourage
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1Public skepticism about executive pay and its relationship to the
performance of the firms they manage has a long history. Sixty years ago,
back in 1939, President Roosevelt, addressing Congress and a national radio
audience, inveighed against corporate executives as part of the forces
of "entrenched greed" (Fortune, 1939). Four days after his speech, the
U.S. Treasury Department published a list of names of individuals reported
to be paid above $15,000 at U.S. corporations. In the same year, Fortune
also reported the results of an opinion poll; ". ..over half of those
responding felt executive of large corporations were paid too much." Since
that time detailed disclosure of the compensation of the highest paid
individuals in publicly held firms has been legally required. And executive
pay continues to evoke skepticism in the press.
While preparing to write this chapter, we sampled sixty years of media
accounts and opinion polls regarding executive compensation. Five recurring
themes emerged:
. U.S. corporate executives are overpaid; their high level of
compensation arouses ethical concerns over excessive pay;
. Corporate policies which determine executive pay ignore the interests
of shareholders;
. Employment agreements, such as golden parachutes, shield executives'
pay from the sacrifices and risks faced by other employees and often
run cmlnter to the long term interests of the firms and
. Executive compensation simply does not make much sense; factors
that might be expected to have an effect--company performance and
size; the riskiness of the business, the experience and training
of individuals--do matter but not as much as expected;
2. Changes in an executive's pay are unrelated to changes in the
performance of firms they manage.
TIle contemporary press reads like updated versions of these sixty
year old themes. Each Spring, the media publishes some variation on:
"Corporate leaders took home fatter pay checks last year... Did
shareholders get their money's worth?" or "Top Executive Pay Peeves the
Public: Are They Really Worth The Money" (See for example, Business Week,
1984, 1985, 1986, 1988; Wall Street Journal 1985, AFL-CIO, 1988, Crystal,
1988a,b; Loomis, 1984.) Fortune recently commissioned a study entitled
"The Wacky, Wacky World of CEO Pay" (Crystal, 1988a). Over 75% of the
American public believes that top corporate executives are not worth the
compensation they receive, according to a Lou Harris poll (Business Week,
1984 ). Ironically, the spector of increased Congressional and SEC
regulation emanates from the very consultants who advise compensation
committees on executive pay and whose fees are based in part on the billing
revenues generated by that advice (Loomis, Fortune, 1984).
In the earliest press accounts, except for a few well selected
examples, these themes are based more on exhortation than evidence. In
recent years, articles appearing in Business Week and Fortune include
extensive data, details on the form of pay (e.g., base, annual cash bonuses
and stock options) and employ more sophisticated analysis. Nevertheless,
the recent writers are no less critical of executive pay practices (Crystal,
1988a,b) .
Conflicting views seldom get much coverage. Evidence supporting
various views is published in academic journals (Ehrenberg & Milkovich,
1988; Baker, Jensen & Murphy, 1988). Perhaps the lack of wider coverage
is attributable to researchers propensity to write only for each other.
3The evidence and conclusions are often embedded in statistical analysis
unaccessible to the public. Perhaps because they are sensitive to their
Universities reward systems, researchers seldom translate their studies
for the press or the public. A few notable exceptions do exist. For
example, Murphy (1986) summarizing his extensive research in the Harvard
Business Review, concluded that "On average, compensation policies encourage
to act on behalf of their shareholders and to put in the best managerial
performance they can."
Purpose of This Chapter
Our task in this chapter is to discuss what is known or at least
strongly supported by the empirical research on executive compensation.
Upon reading this chapter, the reader should be able to cull beliefs from
the evidence regarding executive pay. We also argue that a strategic
perspective on executive pay requires research that looks beyond how much
executives earn. Rather research is required to better understand (1)
the relationships between risks and returns in executive pay plans and
(2) how to improve the link between executive pay and the performance of
the firms they manage.
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: MORE COMPLEX THAN MEETS THE EYE
At the outset, it is useful to stress that executive compensation
is multidimensional (Patton 1956, Ellig 1982, ACA 1988). For the purposes
of this chapter, three dimensions, pay levels, forms and structures provide
a useful framework. It will allow us to examine what is known in the
research. Also embedded within this framework are the risk and return
relationships that are fundamental to managing executive compensation.
4According to wanagers and consultants in this field the relationships
between the risks executives face and the returns they receive are essential
to insure the availability of critical executive talent and to influence
executive performance (Crystal 1988b, Cooke 1988).
Pay level refers to the dollar amount of total compensation paid;
the total financial returns received by an executive. It is the dimension
of executive pay most often reported by the media. A survey of total cash
compensation (salary and bonus) for the top five executives is shown in
Exhibit 1 (Conference Board, 1988). Level includes the value of all forms
of pay; base salary and annual cash bonus as reported in Exhibit 1, plus
long term incentives, perks, golden parachutes, and other benefits.
In addition to level, executive pay also varies by the forms in which
it is paid. Common forms include base, annual cash bonus, long term
incentives such as stock options and appreciation rights, perks such as
club memberships and other benefits. Exhibit 2 shows some of the variations
in annual bonuses as a percent of base salary. Note that 12% of the chief
executives receive 100% or more of their base in the form of cash bonus;
whereas the median bonus for executives was 62% of base. Obviously pay
systems differ in terms of the relative importance of each pay form--'in
the data in Exhibit 2 the middle 50% range of Chief Executives receive
from 43 to 78% bonus awards. Similar differences are reported in surveys
of long term incentives and perks (Cooke, 1988).
Equally apparent is that alternative pay forms differ in the degree
of risk and returns they offer. For example, pay plans that are highly
leveraged with annual bonuses (e.g. those CEO's in Exhibit 2 with 100%
bonuses) are probably more risky than less leveraged plans (e.g. CEOs with
the 9% bonuses in Exhibit 2).
Exhibit 1
1987 Total Compensation
(Salary + Bonus)
Differential Differential
Compensation Rank Median to Highest Compensation Rank Median to Highest
Manufacturing (254 firms) Commercial Banks (93 firms)
Highest paid $642,000 Highest paid $412,000
Second 400,000 62.3% Second 260,000 63.1%
Third 320,000 49.8 Third 215,000 52.2
Fourth 283,000 44.1 Fourth 185,000 44.9
Fifth 252,000 39.3 Fifth 166,000 40.3
Trade (33 firms) Insurance (91 firms)
Highest paid $413,000 Highest paid $398,000
Second 318,000 77. 0% Second 255,000 64.1%
Third 268,000 64.9 Third 195,000 49.0
Fourth 212,000 51.3 Fourth 167,000 42.0
Fifth 195,000 47.2 Fifth 150,000 37.7
Energy (31 firms) Utilities (Ill firms)
Highest paid $525,000 Highest paid $355,000
Second 400,000 76.2% Second 218,000 61.4%
Third 359,000 68.4 Third 171,000 48.2
Fourth 213,000 40.6 Fourth 149,000 42.0
Fifth 200,000 38.1 Fifth 142,000 40.00
Adapted from Human Resources Briefings Conference Board, 4, 10, Oct. 1988, p. 1.
Differential is the ratio of each level to the highest paid by industry group.
VI
Chief Second Third Fourth Fifth
1984 Bonus Awards Executives Highest Paid Highest Paid Highest Paid Highest Paid
(Percent of Salary) Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
100% or more 13 120;0 10 9% 8 7% 8 7% 10 9%
90-99 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
80-89 9 9 5 5 5 5 4 4 3 3
70-79 17 16 16 15 12 11 7 6 10 9
60-69 16 15 12 11 14 13 15 14 11 10
50-59 14 13 21 19 18 17 20 18 14 13
40-49 12 11 17 16 18 17 20 18 22 20
30-39 8 7 11 10 15 14 17 16 13 12
20-29 9 8 7 7 9 8 10 9 14 13
Less than 20% 7 6 7 7 8 7 6 6 10 9
Total 109 100% 108 100% 109 100°/0 109 100% 109 100%
Median Bonus 62°1b 57% 53% 50% 47%
Middle 50% Range 43-78% 41-72% 39-70% 36-65% 32-69%
1983 Median Bonus 58% 55% 50% 50% 44%
Exhibit 2
Annual Bonus Awards as Percent of Base Salary
Source: Top Executives Compensation in u.S. Based Multinationals 1986 editions,
Conference Board, Bulletin 191.
<3'
greater bonuses. Exhibit 3 illustrates the risk-return tradeoff inherent
in pay systems. Executives A & B pay plans are identical (base $200K bonus
$200K); but B's performance targets make it a more risky plan. Hence,
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Risks however, involves the chances of receiving the returns.
Presumably more difficult performance targets are associated with the
to get B to undertake that risk may require a greater return (Bl: $350K
bonus) or an increased base salary (Bll: $300K base and $200K bonus) thereby
lowering the risk. The point is that the risk in executive pay plans refers
to the chances of receiving the pay and depends on the performance targets
established in the plan.
The third dimension of executive pay, structures, directs attention
to decisions about differentials. These include pay differences among
each individual on the executive team as well as the ratio of the lowest
paid employee to the highest paid executive. Note that in the data shown
in Exhibit 2, the differentials of the four highest paid executives to
the CEO's pay differs across industry groups. Firms in manufacturing,
insurance and banking maintain wider cash differentials among executives
than firms in trade and energy (Conference Board 1988). Similar differences
occur across firms within a single industry (Rabin 1987).
From a strategic perspective, level, forms, structure and the risk-
return relationship provide a framework for analyzing executive
compensation. For example, ttle level of pay offered by competitors for
executive talent is believed to affect the firm's ability to attract
qualified executives and hang on to them (Ellig 1982). Consequently,
attention is focused on positioning the level of pay relative to
competitors. But the degree of risk involved in competitors pay levels
Pay
Returns
$J K
SOOK
400K
Exhibit 3
Risk-Return Tradeoffs in Pay Systems
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(Bonus:
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9also needs to be considered. The risk-return tradeoffs involved in a pay
system may act as a signal to executives. It communicates the risk taking
behaviors the firm values as well as the firm's pay for performance
philosophy.
Decisions about the composition of various forms of pay focus on
several critical policies. These include the firm's pay-for-performance
philosophy, its short and long term emphasis, and its focus on growth,
market share, and return on shareholder value. For example, the firm's
pay-for-performance philosophy is reflected in the ratio of performance-
based pay (e.g., bonuses and performance shares) to base or total
compensation. The short/long term emphasis is reflected in its ratio of
annual cash bonus to performance share, (admittedly difficult, though not
impossible, to value). However, caution is required because the different
pay forms may act differently under different conditions. Consider an
executive compensation agreement that includes base, annual cash bonuses
based on financial performance, and annual restricted stock grants
negotiated for each year of a five year term covered by the agreement.
Under this plan, a poor performance year may yield no cash bonus, but the
executive may still receive significant returns from the stock grants.
The effects of the stock grants, negotiated as part of the five year
agreement to attract or retain the executive, may be so large as to swamp
any short term leverage intended through the cash bonus. All things being
equal, the poor financial performance will be reflected in the value of
the stock, and the executive does face lost opportunity by not being granted
the cash bonus. But all things are seldom equal, and the relative value
of the stock in any period can offset the value of the lost bonus.
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The point here is that the mix of pay forms translates into risk-return
tradeoffs for an executive. It is analogous to a portfolio of investments,
with risks and returns associated with each investment in the portfolio
as well as an aggregated risk-return for the total portfolio. To assess
the risk-return tradeoffs inherent in any pay system requires that the
returns from all forms be examined.
The third dimension, structures, focuses on to decisions about
differences in pay within an organization. Differences in the short-long
term provisions and golden parachute agreements among the individual members
of an executive team are examples. From a strategic perspective, more
egalitarian policies--"we are all in this together"--translate into smaller
differences among members of the executive team in terms of the compensation
levels, forms, and risks. Less egalitarian policies imply greater
differences. Surprisingly very little is known about the effects of
different structures on executive behaviors or on their firms' performance.
Some economists have modeled executive pay as if it were a "tournament"
or competition among players (Lazear and Rosen 1981, Bull, Schutter &
Weigett, 1987). Their analysis focuses on the size of the differentials
between the "winners" (top executive) and the rest of the field (presumed
to be the other executives). They argue that sizeable differentials for
the top position are required to motivate executives to compete and
investment "game." But top executives often bring in their own teams,
and encourage "losers" to play in other organizations. So it is not clear
what the observed differentials (such as those reported in Exhibit 2)
actually affect. And if the current work on high commitment-high
involvement organizations has any merit, cooperation, not competition among
team members, is a more desirable state (Lawler 1988, Walton 1987, Klingel
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& Mar-tin 1988). If teamwor-k, corrunitment and r-isk sharing among production
and staff employees, has payoffs; presumably the same logic applies to
executives.
Another structural issue is the highly visible and publicized gap
between returns received by executives and those received by other
employees. A recent study reported that a European CEO's pay was 6 to
8 times that of an entry professional compared to a ratio of 14 in the
U.S. (TPF&C, 1988). This gap is most obvious when significant cash bonuses
are paid to executives at the same time concessions are demanded from other
employees. The effects of these differences on workforce performance and
attitudes are also not well researched. But a good bet is that the results
are not positive.
In summary, executive compensation can be examined in terms of the
level of returns, the compensation of different pay forms in the plan (risk-
return relationships), and the pay differences among individual executives.
A strategic perspective considers the entire pattern of pay decisions
(Milkovich, 1988). Thus, a strategic issue for executive pay in the 1990's
is not only how much executives earn, but what risks are associated with
the higher levels of pay. What risk-return tradeoffs are involved? Does
higher executive pay imply a substantially greater risk for executives?
Is performance rewarded? And how are executives compensated in comparison
to the rest of the work force? It is to what is known about these questions
that we next turn.
THE RESEARCH
Much of the early research on executive compensation focused on the
sales versus profit debate (Ciscel & Carroll 1980). At its heart, the
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issue was whether executive pay policies encouraged pursuit of revenue
and growth or the shareholders' financial well being. The earliest
research, dating back to the fifties, examined whether sales or reported
profits was more highly correlated with the level of cash compensation
(base and annual bonus). The results yielded mixed conclusions. In the
main, the level of cash compensation is correlated with both the level
of sales and profits, although sales tends to be more important in most
studies. The empirical results suggest that a firm with ten percent larger
sales will pay its executives an average of 3 percent more (Baker, Jensen
& Murphy 1988). These results are not too surprising when we consider
the majority of executive pay surveys. These surveys, tailored for fi.rm's
compensation committees, emphasize cash compensation (base plus bonus)
in relation to firms' revenues. Hence, the findings of strong relationships
between revenues and cash compensation.
Another obvious explanation is that larger firms may employ more
qualified executives and are able to pay them more. The finding of 10%
sales growth to 3% greater cash compensation has lead some researchers
to observe "...that executives can increase their pay by increasing their
firm's revenues even when the increase in size reduces their firm's market
value. This could explain some of the vast amount of inefficient
expenditures of cOrPOrate resources on diversification programs that have
created large conglomerates over the last twenty years." (Baker,Jensen,
Murphy 1988, p. 609).
More recently, a wave of studies extended this interest in sales versus
profit objectives by analyzing whether other factors affected executive
compensation. Generally these studies report that the industry in which
a firm operates is related to cash compensation paid to its executives.
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On average, industries paying highest to lowest are manufacturing, energy,
banking, insurance, utilities and trades (Conference Board, 1988). Firms
in the mature or later product cycles tend to pay higher cash compensation
than those in earlier start upstages which offer great amounts of stock
options and ownership (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin 1987). And firms controlled
by a few dominant stockholders (contrasted with "management-controlled
firms") exhibit stronger links between financial returns and executives'
cash compensation (Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, & Hinkin, 1987).
In short, the research suggest that on average, executive pay levels
are correlated with levels of revenues, profits, industry, product life
cycle and type of ownership.
However, these studies offer little practical guidance. At best,
they report "what was" or "what is", but are limited in four very serious
ways. First, the majority of this research says nothing at all about "what
if" an executive's pay system has a particular pay level, a given risk
level or a particular structure. These issues are simply not well addressed
by researchers. Second, these studies are usually restricted to cash
compensation levels. This ignores other performance based forms such as
stock options or performance shares or even complex employment contracts
which may reduce or even eliminate the performance link and risk which
an executive faces. For example, Rabin (1987) found that the use of
employment agreements on average, is associated with lower performance
levels as measured by ROE, shareholder value and sales. The third
limitation of this research, is that many studies do not attempt to account
for differences in the composition of pay forms, where the degree of risk
and the link to performance may differ. Hence, we are not able to answer
questions about whether firms which utilize more risky pay systems
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experience different performance. The fourth limitation of much of the
existing research involves the measurement of time. Crystal (1988b)
discusses the lag in time between policy decisions and results. However,
the research approach most commonly employed is to analyze pay and
performance at the same points in time. If we are interested in the effects
of compensation, a "time series" approach which includes appropriate time
lags is required. If, for example, we are interested in the effects of
long term incentives, then the performance we are interested in is
"tomorrow's performance." It is incorrect to look at the relationship
between today's performance and today's pay.
In short, to document a correlation between cash compensation today
and today's performance is not in itself evidence of complex executive
pay systems impact on corporate performance. The inquiry must recognize
(1) the complexities in executive pay; (levels, forms, structures and risk-
return relationships), (2) measure total not just cash compensation, and
(3) consider the time lags involved.
More recent studies are beginning to overcome many of these
shortcomings. Several recent studies have documented a strong positive
relationship between CEO pay (measured as cash compensation) and firm
performance (measured by changes in shareholder wealth as well as accounting
measures) . The common result is that firm performance alone is associated
with relatively small year to year changes in CEO pay. Rate of return
on common stock, for example explained at most 8% of the percentage changes
in CEO bonus and salary (Baker, Jensen & Murphy 1988).
Another study, incorporating a series of time lags covering the short,
medium and longer terms, found that executive pay systems, characterized
by pay return, risk and structure, was related to the firms' future
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financial results (Rabin, 1987). The pay system in its entirety, (that
is--more than just pay level) explained a significant portion of the
variation in the future financial performance of firms. These effects
differed across industries, time periods and performance measures. One
implication of these findings is that it may be more efficient to emphasize
one form of pay over another, depending upon the desired performance
objective and industry. For example, within high technology firms, less
emphasis on pay levels may be balanced by greater attention to performance
based and risky forms of pay (Rabin, 1987). This study also found that
within some industries, (e.g., manufacturing machinery) the use of
employment agreements was associated with a decline in performance over
time. Finally, this study reported that stock options did not seem to
have any effects on firm performance, and the level of base compensation
was negatively related to profits and growth in some industries. All to
say, these results support our contention that executive compensation is
more complex than meets the eye.
Very recently, some researchers have begun to analyze the relationship
between executive pay systems and the firm's financial policy as distinct
from its financial performance. The premise is that a strategic approach
to executive pay should include the financial and strategic policies made
throughout the organization. Recent evidence in four separate studies
found that executive pay policy is related to other corporate level
policies. One study found a strong relationship between the dividend
policies which firms pursue over time and their disclosure of executives'
base salary and annual bonuses (Rabin 1988). Another study found that
capital structure decisions--debt ratios --are negatively related to
management's shareholding (Friend & Pang 1988). These authors suggest
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that this reflects the greater nondiversifiable risk of debt to top
management than to shareholders. Another study analyzed the relationship
between common stock and option holding of managers and the choice of
investment and financing decisions by firms (Larcker 1983). These findings
offer support to a positive relationship between the security holdings
of managers and the changes in firm performance, financial leverage.
Relationships have also been found between the choice of accounting schemes
and the type of executive bonus plans (Larcker, 1983). In short, the
empirical evidence of these studies support the proposition that executive
pay policy are related to firm financial policy decisions and performance
results. They also offer support to those who argue that executive pay
policies can support overall business strategy.
Virtually all these studies find that changes in executive compensation
are positively correlated with financial performance measures. These
findings do not support the concern, widely reported in the press, that
executives do not pursue objectives consistent with the interest of the
owners of the corporation. Rather, the findings from the recent research
suggest that executives' compensation does seem to be designed in ways
related to the economic performance of their firms.
Another recent stream of research focuses on whether particular forms
of executive pay are associated with improved returns to shareholders.
Labelled "event" studies, they analyze the stock market's reaction to the
announcement of a specific event. The premise underlying this research
is that markets react to managerial decisions that affect cash flows--
positive decisions yield increases in shareholder wealth. And changes
in shareholder wealth (stock prices) are interpreted as changes in firm
performance.
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Applied to executive compensation, these studies have examined the
market's reaction to the announcement of specific short or long term
incentive schemes, executive turnover and replacements, and golden
parachutes (Bhagat, Brickley & Lease, 1985, Brickley, Bhagat & Lease, 1985,
Larcker, 1983, Lambert & Larcker, 1985),
The findings indicate that the market does react between one to two
percent of total shareholder value to announcements of changes in executive
pay plans. Two possible explanations can be given for these findings.
The first is that different forms of pay do act as incentives that affect
executive decisions and, consequently, shareholder wealth. One study,
for example, reported that the adoption of long term performance share
plans were followed by increases in capital investments (Larcker, 1983).
Another possibility is that changes in executive pay plans are made in
anticipation of improved earnings. In this view, changes in pay schemes
are a form of insider information that signal changes in the firm's
financial fortunes. Other explanations, such as changes in tax regulations
and accounting conventions, may also account for the observed changes i.n
both executive pay and stock values.
On balance, caution is required when drawing conclusions from these
"events" studies. These studies do find an association between the adoption
of particular forms of executive pay (golden parachutes, stock option
grants, etc.) and higher stock market returns. But note that these forms
of pay are designed to affect decisions that will improve the long-term
performance of the firm, yet the stock price changes associated with these
Only one study, on changes inevents are measured in the short term.
capital investment policies, found that executive decisions were altered
by adopting different forms of pay (Larcker, 1983).
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CONCLUSIONS SUPPORTED BY THE RESEARCH
To summarize, a growing body of research evidence supports conclusions
that run counter to many of the themes found in the popular press. These
are:
1. Executive's pay levels are related to their firm's economic
performance. Despite the anecdotes of exception in the press,
within the majority of firms, the level of compensation is, on
average, ~elated to a wide variety of performance measures,
including shareholder wealth, sales profits, and return on equity.
And changes in pay levels are, on average, related to changes
in these performance levels.
2. Differences in the riskiness of pay systems seem to be related
to firms' financial performance. Employment agreements, percentage
of annual bonus and the use of stock options are all related to
differences in financial results. The degree of these
relationships vary by industry group and timing of the effects.
3. Executive compensation plans do matter to the investment community
and stockholders. Different forms of pay may "signa11l the overall
strategic position of firms to investors. Therefore, changes
in compensation plans may inform investors of impending changes
in the firm's value and may act as incentives that affect executive
decisions.
4. Executive pay levels are related to specific firm characteristics,
including firms' revenues product markets strategies, stage of
development, and the industry in which it competes.
In concluding this section, it is useful to note what these findings
do not allow us to conclude.
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First, note we emphasize association not causation--executive pay
levels are related to (do not cause) their firms' economic performance.
Firms' financial performance and consequently their abilities to pay, do
affect the rate at which all employees including executives are compensated.
And compensation plans with appropriate risk-return links may act as
incentives that affect executive decisions. The research offers documented
evidence for a relationship between pay and performance--but not causation.
Next, the research offers very little guidance on which to base
decisions about the executive pay. At best, it reports "what was" or "what
is", but we have yet to directly examine questions about the "what if's".
For example, under what conditions is the payoff from a high risk-high
return plan (e.g., low base pay with high performance targets and
incentives) superior to a low risk-high return plan (e.g., high base with
a high probability of receiving bonuses and stock grants). These are
perhaps the most useful, yet the most difficult questions to answer. We
turn next to a brief agenda for research in executive compensation in the
1990's.
RESEARCH AGENDA: WHAT WE NEED TO KNOW
Research clearly indicates that the issue of executive pay and firm
performance is far more complex than the media has presented it. Not only
is pay level important, but so are the risks underlying alternative forms
of pay. Risk focuses on the pay-performance link. The difference in
financial performance across firms may be traced in part to differences
in executive compensation risks and returns executives face. Ignoring
the riskiness of pay systems may lead to misleading conclusions.
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The effects of the structure or hierarchy of executive compensation,
both within the executive team and between executives and the rest of the
work force, need to be better understood. If the executives in an
organization are to constitute more than a collection of individuals
competing for the top job, then the effects of pay differences among the
individual executives need to be better understood. And, as noted earlier,
the impact of significant gaps between executive and employee pay is a
topic on which speculation is rife, but research is rare.
It is noteworthy that no studies exist on how the level of executive
compensation affects economic performance. We do not know, for example,
whether paying higher salary levels designed to attract and retain key
executives really pays, whether promoting executives from within really
pays, whether different risk-return tradeoffs in pay for performance plans
really do attract executives who are more (or less) prone to take risks.
And we do not know if any of these subsequently affect firm performance.
The state of knowledge in executive pay research brings to mind the
conclusions of Harry Truman's advisors: on the one hand, we do know that
executive pay is related to firm performance. On the other hand, very
little is known about the complex pay-performance relationship; how does
pay affect performance; more is involved than how much an executive gets
paid, and much more remains to be learned.
21
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